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Canterbury, UK
In spite of the social stigma surrounding them, conspiracy theories are a common topic
of public debate on the Internet. The content and tone of these discussions provide
a useful insight into the structure of conspiracist belief systems and the psychological
characteristics of those who believe and disbelieve in conspiracy theories. In this focused
review, we relate patterns of behavior found in online comments to the broader research
literature on the psychology of conspiracy theories. Most notably, as conspiracism has its
basis in disbelieving a mainstream or received narrative rather than in believing a specific
alternative, most conspiracist arguments tend to fall along those same lines. Finally, we
examine the implications of this methodology for future research into online discussion,
particularly among hard-to-research populations.
Keywords: conspiracy theories, conspiracy mentality, computer-mediated communication, persuasion,
projection, worldviews
Introduction
By all accounts, conspiracy theories have been around for a long time. Contemporary speculation
about assassinations, terrorist attacks, wars, medicine, and climate science follows on from a
rich tradition—the witch panics of medieval Europe, rumors of Masonic conspiracies to destroy
Christianity and monarchy, and long-standing suspicions that governments lie and cheat in order
to maintain power. In conspiracist worldviews, the major forces in the world are not overt, but
covert, hiding from the world at large as they move the pieces into place for their impending
masterstroke (Hofstadter, 1964; Byford, 2011).
The Internet has been a particular boon for the spread of conspiracy theories. Online publishing
is free, instantaneous, global, and unburdened by editorial control. Conspiracy theories, now
unhindered by skeptical publishers and producers, can reach a wider audience than ever—and
one does not need to seek them out to come across them (Klein et al., 2015). They can be seen
in the comment sections of many major news websites, for example, providing an underground
counterpoint to the views expressed in the parent article (cf. Sapountzis and Condor, 2013;
Harambam and Aupers, 2015). As the visibility of conspiracy theories has increased, so too has
the volume of research into the psychology of conspiracy belief. Although there was some early
work on the subject in the mid- to late-twentieth century, most of what we know about belief and
disbelief in conspiracy theories comes from research conducted in the past 15 years. Much of this
research is correlational, so it remains largely unclear whether the identified variables contribute to
conspiracy belief, are effects of conspiracy belief, or are associated with it for some other reason.
Nevertheless, a general picture is emerging, and given the right information we can predict with
reasonable certainty the degree to which someone sees conspiracy as the driving force in human
history.
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KEY CONCEPT 1 | Conspiracy theory
An allegation regarding the existence of a secret plot between powerful people
or organizations to achieve some goal (usually sinister) through systematic
deception of the public.
In this focused review, we use the content of online
discussions of conspiracy theories to place recent research
findings into context. We review the methods and findings of a
recent study (Wood and Douglas, 2013) that examined Internet
debates regarding 9/11 conspiracy theories, drawing conclusions
from the way in which people choose to represent their beliefs
to others and relating the findings of this study to the broader
research context.
Given what we know about conspiracist worldviews, what
can we expect about how people might try to convince others
of conspiracy theories? A core concept here is projection—the
tendency to use the self as a model for how others think and
behave. Many social judgments rely on projection, including
belief and disbelief in conspiracy theories. The degree to which
someone believes that a conspiracy is behind a particular event
(say, the death of Princess Diana) depends in part on whether
they would carry out the conspiracy themselves if they were
in the same position as the alleged perpetrators (Douglas and
Sutton, 2011). In other words, people may think “If I were in their
position, I would have done it too,” so then it is plausible that such
a conspiracy actually happened.
Projection is also used in persuasion. We cannot see into
others’ minds, and we do not always know someone well enough
to predict how they will react to something. In the absence of
information about others, we tend to assume that they are more
or less like us, and that their reactions to a certain stimulus will
be similar to our own—in other words, we project (for a review,
see Robbins and Krueger, 2005). When we know relatively little
about our audience, we use the arguments that we ourselves
find most convincing, and these tend to be the arguments that
fit with our own worldview (Darwin et al., 2011; Newheiser
et al., 2011; Wood et al., 2012; Lewandowsky et al., 2013). This
reasoning is the core of the current focused review. In the absence
of information about what others might find convincing—
say, when arguing with an audience of complete strangers
over the Internet—our arguments will tend to reflect our own
beliefs and preconceptions. Thus, an attempt at persuasion
can serve as an informative window into the mental life of
the persuader.
In a recently published study (Wood and Douglas, 2013),
we made several predictions regarding the patterns of discourse
in online arguments about conspiracy theories. Our hypotheses
were based on the logic that in the absence of information about
the target of persuasion, arguments are essentially projective. In
other words, people’s chosen arguments reflect their own belief
systems.
Conspiracy theories regarding 9/11 presented themselves
an ideal subject of study for this type of analysis. These
theories generally allege that the 9/11 attacks were perpetrated
by elements within the U.S. government, intelligence agencies,
and/or Israel, and falsely blamed on Middle Eastern extremists.
Common claims include that the Twin Towers and World Trade
Center 7 were destroyed by demolition charges planted ahead
of time, that the Pentagon was hit by a missile or drone rather
than a passenger jet, and that United Airlines Flight 93 was shot
down by a fighter jet or surface-to-air missile. While they are not
amajority view inWestern nations, unlike the alternative theories
regarding the death of President John F. Kennedy (Swift, 2013),
9/11 conspiracy theories are reasonably common and highly
visible in the public sphere. The 9/11 Truth Movement produces
a tremendous amount of output, including books, documentary
films, the peer-reviewed Journal of 9/11 Studies, conferences,
websites, advertising campaigns, and so on. Its adherents include
prominent religious figures and heads of state, and there are
many different and competing versions of events that circulate
within the movement. In short, the conspiracist community
surrounding 9/11 is large, diverse, and well-developed. It
is an excellent example of twenty first-century conspiracy
culture.
While there are many discussion forums, blogs, and news
websites devoted to both advancing and debunking the
arguments of the 9/11 Truth Movement, we decided to avoid
these venues as a source for data in our recent study (Wood and
Douglas, 2013). There are a few reasons for this. First, we were
primarily interested in persuasive communications—attempts
at convincing another person of a particular interpretation
of 9/11. In an environment where everyone more or less
agrees that 9/11 was (or was not) an inside job, there is
not likely to be much direct persuasive communication of
this kind. Moreover, discussion in environments with a great
deal of agreement among the participants can lead to group
polarization—the tendency for like-minded groups and their
members to develop more and more extreme opinions over time.
The development of group polarization could in turn affect the
level of hostility in communication (e.g., Spears et al., 1990).
Finally, we considered it important to collect a reasonably large
sample of both conspiracist and conventionalist comments, and
websites catering to one group are unlikely to feature many
postings from the other.
KEY CONCEPT 2 | Conventionalist explanation
An account that attributes the cause of an event or social condition to overt
processes or coincidence rather than to a hidden conspiracy.
As such, we extracted online comments from mainstream
news websites. Although these sites inevitably take
conventionalist positions, they attract large numbers of
comments of both types, many of which are aimed at persuading
undecided readers. Specifically, from four mainstream news
websites, we collected all persuasive comments regarding
9/11 conspiracy theories from news articles on 9/11 from the
second half of the year 2011. With the tenth anniversary of
9/11 happening that year, there were many articles on the
attacks, their causes, their effects, and, of course, the conspiracy
theories surrounding them. Whether the articles mentioned
conspiracy theories or not, however, the comment sections
would often include a spirited debate between conspiracists
and conventionalists regarding the true cause of the attacks,
providing a great deal of raw material.
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In examining online debates about 9/11, we collected a large
sample of 2174 comments from a variety of news websites. Our
analysis of these comments revealed some noteworthy patterns
regarding the nature of online discussion of conspiracy theories,
and provided valuable insight into the minds of conspiracists and
conventionalists. We measured several aspects of each comment,
dealt with in each of the subsections below.
Other Conspiracy Theories
In debating the various conspiracy theories regarding 9/11, it
is relatively common for people to refer to other conspiracy
theories, such as the assassination of President John F. Kennedy
(JFK), as a reference point. Interestingly, the number of unrelated
conspiracy theories mentioned favorably and unfavorably was
different between conspiracist and conventionalist comments.
On average, conspiracist comments mentioned about six times as
many other conspiracy theories as being true as conventionalist
comments did (0.12 vs. 0.02 per comment). Conventionalist
comments, on the other hand, made about nine times as many
negative references to other conspiracy theories as conspiracist
comments did (0.18 vs. 0.02 per comment).
This replicates a classic finding in conspiracy psychology—
the tendency for conspiracy beliefs to be positively correlated
with one another. In the most comprehensive analysis of the
correlates of conspiracy theorizing to date, Swami et al. (2010)
were able to explain over 50% of the variance in beliefs in
9/11 conspiracy theories with a model incorporating a number
of psychological variables. People were more likely to believe
that 9/11 was an inside job if they were highly exposed to the
relevant conspiracy theories, cynical about politics, disagreeable,
and anti-authoritarian. The strongest predictor by far, however,
was beliefs in other conspiracy theories. In fact, this is probably
the most consistent finding of the research literature so far—
the more someone believes in one conspiracy theory, the more
they tend to believe in others (see also Goertzel, 1994; Swami
et al., 2011; Wood et al., 2012). While this correlation may be
attributable in part to the fact that many diverse conspiracy
beliefs are predicted by the same variables (Sutton and Douglas,
2014), many researchers have interpreted this key finding as
evidence for a general conspiracy worldview, a belief system in
which conspiracy is the dominant force in history and the truth
of major events is hidden from the public as a matter of course
(Goertzel, 1994; Imhoff and Bruder, 2014). This worldview or
thinking style, sometimes referred to as conspiracist ideation
(e.g., Lewandowsky et al., 2013), is characterized by a general
opposition to the mainstream or a distrust of the institutions of
society at large. Conspiracist ideation is seen not as a positive
belief, but a negative belief—a disbelief, or a generalized rejection
of received narratives rather than an acceptance of specific
alternatives. Being a “conspiracy theorist” is not about believing
in a particular conspiracy, but in rejecting the official story.
KEY CONCEPT 3 | Conspiracism/conspiracist ideation
The general tendency to attribute significant events or social conditions to
hidden conspiracies rather than to overt processes or coincidence.
Several converging lines of evidence support this conception
of the nature of conspiracist ideation. Wood et al. (2012)
demonstrated thatmutually contradictory conspiracy beliefs tend
to be positively correlated—the more someone believed that
Princess Diana was assassinated by MI6, the more they also
tended to believe that she was assassinated by her boyfriend’s
family’s business rivals; the more someone believed that Osama
bin Laden died long before his supposed death in 2011, the more
they believed that he survived the American raid that was said
to have killed him. Imhoff and Bruder (2014) and Oliver and
Wood (2014) have demonstrated that conspiracist ideation is
mostly independent of other sociopolitical dimensions like right-
wing authoritarianism, conservatism, and social dominance
orientation (though not entirely; see, e.g., Grzesiak-Feldman and
Izrycka, 2009). Van Prooijen et al. (2015) and Inglehart (1987)
have shown that conspiracy belief tends to be higher among
people who find themselves outside the political mainstream—
those with either extreme left-wing or extreme right-wing
politics are more likely than relative centrists to perceive a
conspiracy behind society. Acceptance of conspiracy theories is
also positively correlated with proneness to boredom (Brotherton
and Eser, 2015), agency detection (Van der Tempel and Alcock,
2015; Douglas et al., in press), political cynicism (Swami et al.,
2010, 2011), and anomie (Goertzel, 1994; Abalakina-Paap et al.,
1999). Similarly, Swami et al. (2010) found that conspiracy belief
is more prevalent among people with a disagreeable personality,
though other studies have found no such effect (Swami et al.,
2013; Lobato et al., 2014). By portraying a disliked outgroup
as a sinister enemy of ambiguously vast power, conspiracy
theories may help to manage threat and anxiety (Kofta and
Se¸dek, 2005; Swami, 2012; Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013; Sullivan
et al., 2014; Mashuri and Zaduqisti, 2015). Finally, theoretical
and qualitative works present a convincing case that conspiracy
theorizing is very often an anti-authoritarian activity, focused on
challenging dominant societal power structures and providing
counter-narratives to mainstream understandings of the world
(Raab et al., 2013; Sapountzis and Condor, 2013; Harambam and
Aupers, 2015).
KEY CONCEPT 4 | Anomie
A feeling of alienation and disconnection from the ideology and values of society
at large.
Taken together, this body of research suggests that the
conspiracist mindset is at odds with acceptance of the
mainstream. People who believe many conspiracy theories tend
to feel alienated from society, to harbor extreme political views,
to feel anxious or threatened, to be cynical about politics, to
have generally disagreeable personalities, to hold views that
diverge from the accepted mainstream, and to generally mistrust
others. On this basis, it seems quite likely that the conspiracist
mindset is characterized to a large extent by disbelief in official
narratives rather than positive belief in alternatives, leading
to a widespread acceptance of many different—and overtly
unrelated—conspiracy theories.
The finding that conspiracist comments tend to be more
positive than conventionalist comments about unrelated
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conspiracy theories matches this body of literature, and thereby
strengthens our case that quantitative content analysis of online
communication can provide valuable information regarding
the thought processes of the communicator. When there
is minimal information about the audience, as in this case,
people use arguments that fit with their broader worldview
and thinking style. The Internet is home to a tremendous
amount of persuasive communications written in public.
Such communications could prove to be an extremely rich
source of observational data for future studies. Moving beyond
comments on others’ work, individual websites or videos could
be coded according to a similar scheme. People seem intuitively
less likely to make inferences about others’ worldviews—
thereby heightening their likelihood to project—when they
are attempting to reach a broad and nonspecific audience,
rather than responding to a particular person in a comment or
forum post.
Interestingly, there was some variance in the other conspiracy
theories chosen by commenters. For the most part, conspiracist
comments referred to relatively well-known and comparatively
mundane theories regarding assassinations and terrorist plots.
The death of JFK was a popular topic, for instance—many
conspiracist comments drew parallels between the widely-
believed alternative theories of President Kennedy’s assassination
(Swift, 2013) and theories that 9/11 was likewise carried
out in secret by the American power elite. Conventionalist
comments, on the other hand, were much more likely to
refer to exotic or ridiculous-sounding conspiracy theories, such
as a cover-up of the existence of Bigfoot, alien abductions,
or reptilian shapeshifters. This raises the possibility that the
differences between conventionalist and conspiracist comments
were an artifact of rhetorical congruency—naturally, people
will pick examples that will support their arguments. However,
the opposite approach is also a valid rhetorical strategy. A
9/11 conventionalist who believes that Princess Diana was
assassinated may be a more convincing figure to a conspiracist
than one who does not believe any conspiracy theories (Maass
and Clark, 1984).
Positive and Negative Argumentation
Based on indications from prior research that the conspiracist
worldview has its basis in disbelief in official explanations
rather than positive belief in alternatives (e.g., Wood et al.,
2012), we expected to see a particular imbalance in the degree
to which commenters used positive and negative arguments.
Specifically, we predicted that conspiracist comments would
contain fewer positive and more negative arguments than
conventionalist comments. In agreement with our prediction,
conventionalist comments used positive arguments about 56%
of the time, compared to 31% of conspiracist comments.
KEY CONCEPT 5 | Negative arguments
Advancing a position by presenting an argument that contradicts an opposing
position: “9/11 was clearly an inside job, since the official story can’t explain the
collapse of Building 7.”
KEY CONCEPT 6 | Positive arguments
Advancing a position by presenting an argument that directly supports it: “9/11
was clearly an inside job, since thermite residue in the wreckage of the Twin
Towers is conclusive evidence of a controlled demolition.”
Negative arguments showed the opposite difference—only 44%
of conventionalist comments argued against the opposing
interpretation, while 64% of conspiracist comments did the same.
Unlike conventionalists, who mostly provided arguments in
favor of their own position, conspiracists overwhelmingly argued
against the opposing positions. By our reasoning above, this
choice of communicative strategy is not accidental. Rather, it
is the sort of argument that conspiracists themselves find most
persuasive and it therefore gives a clue as to how they think
about the world. The use of negative over positive arguments
supports the idea explored above, that the conspiracist worldview
is not about belief in particular explanations for events but a
disbelief in particular explanations—specifically, in mainstream,
received, or official accounts of major events or social conditions.
For the most part, alternative accounts of 9/11 and events like
it are not initially accepted by conspiracists because they do a
good job of explaining the available facts, but because they oppose
the account that comes from a disliked or distrusted source and
because a conspiracist account fits with a broader conspiracist
worldview. Someone who prefers a conspiracist explanation for
9/11 may not have a specific alternative account in mind at all
(cf. Dean, 2002). Rather, if the official account can be discounted,
a conspiracy—however, vague—must have been at work. Recent
research continues to bear out this general idea. Van Prooijen and
Jostmann (2013) have demonstrated the importance of feelings
of uncertainty in cultivating conspiracy belief; Einstein and Glick
(2014) have shown that specific elaboration upon conspiracy
theory claims appears to decrease belief in them; and Swami et al.
(2014) have demonstrated that adopting an analytical mindset,
one characterized by attention to detail, tends to attenuate
conspiracy theory belief. Also, when conspiracy theories are
elaborated upon, people with a better grasp of probability and
logical reasoning may reject them; correlational research has
shown lower conspiracy belief in people who are less susceptible
to the conjunction fallacy (Brotherton and French, 2014), and
lower belief amongst individuals who are less likely to attribute
agency and intentionality to environmental factors by default
(Douglas et al., in press).
Internal politics might also be a factor in the decision to use
negative rather than positive arguments to promote conspiracy
theories. As noted above, the 9/11 Truth Movement is extremely
diverse. Other than the mere existence of a conspiracy and
the falsity of the mainstream account, there may be little that
everyone in the movement agrees upon. Conflicts within the
Truth Movement over topics such as the motives, perpetrators,
or details of the execution of the attacks can be intense, and
often involve allegations that the other party is working for the
conspirators, pushing a misleading conspiracy theory in order
to throw well-meaning truth-seekers off the trail (e.g., Wood,
2009; Fox, 2013). Negative arguments avoid this pitfall. All 9/11
conspiracists can agree that the conventional account is false, so
criticizing it is uncontroversial. A tendency toward a negative
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argument style allows conspiracists to focus on arguing more
with conventionalists and less with each other.
These findings prompt some key questions about the
effectiveness and prevalence of positive and negative
argumentation. If someone prefers positive to negative
arguments or vice versa, is it because they find their preferred
type of argument most convincing, or because they find
their preferred argument type more accessible and easier to
generate? Does the prevalence of negative argumentation in
the conspiracy theory world owe its existence to the structure
of the conspiracist belief system or to political considerations
and a desire for a “big tent” of conspiracy theory? Finally, are
positive or negative arguments ultimately more successful? Does
it depend on the subject matter? Answering these questions may
provide instructive insights into developing effective persuasive
communications tailored to their recipients’ worldviews,
and inform efforts by policy-makers to counter the spread of
potentially harmful conspiracy theories, such as those concerning
vaccination or global climate change (cf. Jolley and Douglas,
2014a,b; Douglas and Sutton, 2015; Douglas et al., 2015, in press).
Mistrust and Powerlessness
Only two comments in the sample of 2174 contained expressions
of powerlessness, an insufficient amount for any reasonable
analysis. Past research has shown strong connections between
conspiracy belief and feelings of powerlessness or loss of control
(Hamsher et al., 1968; Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Whitson and
Galinsky, 2008). However, powerlessness and a lack of control are
not attractive traits to have when attempting to convince others to
one’s worldview. Expressions of powerlessness may have been in
short supply in this sample not because feelings of powerlessness
are rare, but because they were suppressed by the demands of the
situation.
Expressions of mistrust, however, were not in short supply.
Conspiracist comments were more likely to express mistrust
(of society, groups, institutions, and specific people) than
conspiracist comments were (10.6 vs. 1.4%). This result was
as expected. A great deal of research into interpersonal trust
indicates that low trust is associated with beliefs in conspiracy
theories (Hamsher et al., 1968; Wright and Arbuthnot, 1974;
Goertzel, 1994; Yelland and Stone, 1996; Abalakina-Paap et al.,
1999; Leman and Cinnirella, 2013). Whether trust is a cause, an
effect, or both, the relationship seems intuitive. People who trust
others are more likely to accept received explanations at face
value, and less likely to suspect ulterior motives; likewise, belief
that large-scale conspiracies are the driving force in society would
not foster a trusting worldview. Projection may also be a factor in
interpersonal distrust, since people who rate themselves as more
likely to conspire are suspicious that others might do the same
(Douglas and Sutton, 2011).
Hostility
We rated each comment for hostility on a scale from 1 to 5, and
found that conventionalist comments tended to have a higher
hostility rating than conspiracist comments (2.08 vs. 1.44 on a
1–5 scale).
Decades of work on the psychology of social influence has
shown that minorities are most effective in convincing others
of their views if they are calm, consistent, and informative
(e.g., Latané, 1981). Majority groups, on the other hand, can
enforce adherence to social norms in a more forceful manner.
Opinion polls show that most people in the West do not
believe that 9/11 was an inside job (WorldPublicOpinion.org,
2008)—the conspiracist view is a minority one. Conventionalists,
being in the majority, have more flexibility in this regard.
While conventionalists can attempt to enforce conformity
to the majority viewpoint, conspiracists must provide novel
information and attempt to produce internal attitude change
rather than outward conformity (Latané, 1981). The lowered
hostility found for conspiracists indicates that they may have
internalized some of the properties of good minority influencers.
Due to the counterintuitive nature of the hostility finding,
in a novel analysis for the present article we followed up on
our coding with a run of the Linguistic Inquiry and Word
Count (LIWC) textual analysis software (Pennebaker et al.,
2001, 2007). Combining all conspiracist comments together
revealed an instructive difference from a combined entry of
all conventionalist comments: while the two were comparable
in most cases (see Figure 1), the conspiracist comments used
more positive than negative emotional words (1.85% positive vs.
1.58% negative), while the opposite was true for conventionalist
comments (1.55% positive vs. 1.74% negative). While this
analysis did not reveal the targets of these emotional expressions,
this finding is all the more remarkable as the conspiracist
comments usually posited a massive, murderous conspiracy—
something that would seem to justify a great deal of negativity.
The fact that conspiracists’ negativity was outweighed by
conventionalists’ is noteworthy.
This finding is somewhat counterintuitive. Conspiracy
explanations for events are often stigmatized as the product
of mental illness or gullibility (Bratich, 2002, 2008). Of course,
conspiracists can be quite hostile as well, often accusing their
rhetorical opponents of naiveté or even complicity in the
conspiracy (Crane, 2008; Byford, 2011), but in this case the
former seems to outweigh the latter. Interestingly enough,
however, this finding seems to contradict a previous finding
that conspiracy belief is positively correlated with trait hostility
(Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999). It also runs counter to the
stereotype of conspiracists as behaving in an irrational and
unbalanced manner (Bratich, 2008). However, anonymous
online communication is a fairly specific situation, and it is
difficult to draw firm conclusions from these results regarding
personality traits or more broad tendencies in social interaction.
It is quite possible that conspiracist views are correlated with
higher trait hostility in general, but that something about the
communicative situation provokes an unusually hostile reaction
among conventionalists. Regardless, this result should sound a
note of caution for conventionalists: hostility is best avoided
when trying to convince others of something. Conventionalists
tend to overestimate their own rationality and underestimate
others’, which, as Klein et al. (2015) note, may be responsible for
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FIGURE 1 | Results from LIWC analysis of comment database, showing prevalence of self-references (I, me, my), social words, positive emotions,
negative emotions, cognitive words, articles, and words with more than six letters.
conspiracy theories’ unexpected and unnoticed influence upon
those who initially reject them (Douglas and Sutton, 2008).
Usage of “Conspiracy Theory”
Data analysis indicated a general tendency to avoid the
conspiracy theory label. Whether conspiracist or conventionalist,
commenters were largely unwilling to apply it to their own
beliefs, and would often argue the point if others did so.
Evidently, despite endorsing conspiracist explanations, and being
sufficiently committed to them to argue about them extensively,
people appeared to be motivated to avoid the social stigma
associated with the label. In objecting to the label, many
commenters characterized it as an intellectual slur used to
marginalize dissent and pathologize reasonable suspicion, which
is in line with recent scholarly characterizations by Bratich (2002,
2008), deHaven-Smith (2013), and Husting and Orr (2007).
Recent research has borne out the intuitive idea that such a stigma
exists, demonstrating that people tend to view conspiracists as
gullible, naive, crazy, and dishonest (Klein et al., 2015). However,
whether the label is an effective rhetorical weapon is unclear;
recent experiments have shown that simply labeling something
a conspiracy theory does not reduce belief in it (Wood, 2015).
This is a prime area for future research.
Discussion
In general, the findings of Wood and Douglas (2013) provide
an instructive insight into the conspiracist mindset. The results
are in agreement with past work on conspiracy theories, which
indicates that the methodology is a sound one. The arguments
that people use may be a reflection of what they find most
convincing, which in turn may reveal something about their
psychological state.
Content analysis of online communication has several
potential advantages. The amount of raw material publicly
available for such analysis on the Internet is huge. This method
also allows investigation of populations that would be averse
to filling out questionnaires or participating in laboratory
experiments; in fact, people with a high degree of conspiracist
ideation are probably such a category. There are, of course,
some pitfalls to be avoided as well. Namely, there is some
degree of self-presentation at work, as seen in the case of the
powerlessness result reviewed above. In addition, the logic of the
analysis depends on people using projection to determine which
persuasive strategies to adopt. In situations where the person
producing the communication knows their audience, they will
tailor their message accordingly. In that case, the content of
the message would be a reflection of the writer’s perception of
the audience as well as the writer’s own psychological state—
it is only when there is little or no information about the
audience that communications are based mostly on projection
(Friestad and Wright, 1999; Douglas et al., 2010; Vogel et al.,
2010). Researchers must therefore take care to establish whether
the communications under analysis are written to a general
(and thus projected) audience, or to a specific person known
to the author. Moreover, social desirability can play a role
in persuasive communication. Feelings of powerlessness are
not unheard-of among either conspiracists or conventionalists,
yet almost no commenters were willing to state that they
felt powerless. This may be because feeling powerless is not
an attractive prospect when trying to sell others on adopting
a worldview. Given the self-presenting nature of persuasive
communication, caution is warranted when drawing conclusions
regarding socially undesirable subject matter. It is also worth
noting that we have interpreted our results, especially the hostility
result, as manifestations of the influences exerted by the situation
and the properties of the commenters’ belief systems. However,
there is a robust literature on individual differences in conspiracy
belief (e.g., Swami et al., 2011; Uscinski, 2014), so it is possible, as
in any correlational design, that the arrow of causation points the
other way.
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Finally, in any analysis of online discussion, researchers
must take care not to over-interpret the findings. We extracted
about twice as many conspiracist as conventionalist comments,
but due to the self-selecting nature of online discussion this
does not match the popularity of 9/11 conspiracy theories
in the broader population (WorldPublicOpinion.org, 2008).
Moreover, there is the potential for prolific individuals to
dominate conversation. Although the sample consisted of 2174
comments, these were written by only 1156 unique authors,
321 of whom commented more than once. While our findings
were the same when the unit of analysis was authors rather
than comments, this will not always be the case, and there
is always the potential for “sock puppets,” or alternate online
identities run by the same person, to interfere with such
calculations by creating the appearance of consensus where
there is none. In general, researchers should be aware of the
peculiarities and pitfalls of Internet commenting culture in
order to draw reliable conclusions from an online comment
sample.
Conclusions
In this project, we have reviewed the findings of a previous study
(Wood and Douglas, 2013) in the context of existing research
into the psychology of conspiracy theories. Consistent with what
we expected from prior research, conspiracist comments (relative
to conventionalist comments) were less hostile, more likely to
make negative arguments, less likely to make positive arguments,
and more positive toward unrelated conspiracy theories. These
findings support the idea of a broad conspiracist worldview based
on disbelief in mainstream or received narratives, and highlight
the analysis of online communication as a potentially useful tool
for gaining insight into the worldview and assumptions of the
persuader.
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